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Introduction 
 
In his review of the book, Rorty and His Critic (Brandom 2000), Simon Blackburn makes the 
following observation: 
 
Rorty denies that philosophical progress comes about through argument. As he rightly 
reminds us, argument requires premises and conclusions that belong to the same 
conceptual family [or field]. Argument, it follows, is for conservatives. And real 
progress, by contrast, means ‘offering us sparkling new ideas or utopian visions of 
glorious new institutions,’ disabusing us of old routes of inference and feeling, enabling 
us to forget where we once were. It does not mean anything so flat as mere argument 
(2001, 39). 
 
The job of coming up with these sparkling new ideas, of proposing new vocabularies, of 
changing the world, falls to the ‘strong poet.’ The role to which those of us engaged in 
argumentation are relegated seems to be that of the accounting clerk, fitted with visor and sleeve 
protectors, scrutinizing the ledger book of ideas, making sure that the books balance and that no 
calculation errors have been made. 
I would venture to say that many, perhaps most of us working in the areas of 
argumentation theory, Informal Logic and critical thinking like to think of the practice to which 
we are committed as progressive, as contributing to social betterment and intellectual advance. 
We may prefer to imagine ourselves out toiling in those conceptual fields, boots immersed in the 
muddy waters, planting and grafting as well as pruning and weeding, and perhaps even 
harvesting a crop from time to time. I suspect that most of us, whatever our political stripe, 
would resist the idea that we are confined by the very nature of our disciplinary practice, to 
simply uphold and perhaps rearrange the status quo, either intellectually or politically. But this is 
the picture that Rorty paints. In this paper I want to look at whether he is right. Can sparkling 
new ideas arise from argument? 
 
 
Rorty’s View 
 
Let me begin by briefly rehearsing those aspects of Rorty’s broader position that frame 
his views about argument. A central aspect is that it is anti-foundational. He denies the 
possibility of absolute, certain foundations for knowledge and instead claims that justification is 
to be sought within human practices. Such justification is, moreover, limited to particular 
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practices, language games or vocabularies but makes no sense between vocabularies. Argument 
cannot, then, adjudicate between vocabularies.  And even the standards and principles that guide 
evaluation have no normative force but are simply ways of describing the practice. To think 
otherwise is to commit the fallacy of “seeing axioms where there are only shared habits, or 
viewing statements which summarize such practices as if they reported constraints enforcing 
such practices” (Rorty 1991, 26). 
Consistent with this position, Rorty maintains that the kind of philosophy that he is doing 
and advocating does not involve putting forth arguments. He denies that he is playing the game 
of rational discussion but claims, rather, to be engaged in a different practice which he describes 
thus: 
 
It [the new method of philosophy] does not pretend to have a better candidate for doing 
the same old thing which we did when we spoke in the old way. Rather, it suggests that 
we might want to stop doing those things and do something else. But it does not argue 
for this suggestion on the basis of antecedent criteria common to the old and the new 
language game. For just insofar as the new language game really is new, there will be 
no such criteria (Rorty 1989, 9). 
 
He describes the practice in which he is engaged as ‘redescribing’, and states that the aim is to 
make such redescription attractive so that people will begin to adopt the new vocabulary. 
Moreover it is this process of adopting new vocabularies on the basis of their aesthetic appeal 
and not that of rational choice of alternatives based on argument which effects changes in the 
culture. 
 
 
Intellectual Innovation 
 
I have described Rorty’s view not primarily with the aim of engaging in Rortyan exegesis 
per se, but rather in order to highlight certain features of the position and bring out the more 
general picture of intellectual innovation on which his view of argument rests. 
One central feature that marks innovation for Rorty is discontinuity. Innovative ideas 
exhibit a radical sort of novelty. They are not simply continuations and extensions of the 
previous vocabulary but are characterized by a complete break with what has come before. And 
because of this lack of continuity, new vocabularies are incommensurable with those they have 
superceded. This incommensurability means that the innovation cannot be evaluated in terms of 
the criteria that governed the previous vocabulary. 
 Another feature of the Rortyan view of innovation is that it draws a radical distinction 
between the generation and the evaluation or criticism of ideas. The activity of criticism (or 
argument) is seen as rule-bound and rigid, constrained by the logic of the particular framework 
or vocabulary. Innovative ideas are radically new in the sense that they break free of this logic. 
Thus they cannot arise in the context of the application of evaluative criteria of the previous 
framework -- these criteria would keep one trapped within the old framework. New ideas cannot 
be a product of a logical process of incremental alteration of antecedent ideas and views. The 
generation of innovative ideas must be, in some sense, non-logical and unconstrained. 
Generation and criticism are seen, thus, as qualitatively different and even opposed sorts of 
activities. 
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Stated thus, it becomes clear that Rorty’s is but one version of a view about creativity that 
appears, and has appeared historically, in many contexts and guises. Among its most prominent 
proponents were the Romantics. Reacting against the rationalism of the Enlightenment and the 
classical emphasis on tradition, the Romantic poets and theorists glorified the imagination and 
viewed the arts not as imitation but as bringing something new into the world. Coleridge, in 
particular, highlighted the role of the creative imagination in producing something new and 
unprecedented, thereby transforming the artist into a God-like creator (Taylor 1989). Such a feat 
could not be the result of traditional rules or patterns. It was thought to be, rather, the product of 
poetic inspiration, which differs from ordinary ideation in that it is sudden, effortless and 
unanticipated. Abrams (1953, 189) describes it thus: “The poem or passage springs to 
completion all at once, without the prior intention of the poet, and without that process of 
considering, rejecting, and selecting alternatives which ordinarily intervene between the 
intentions and the achievement” (in other words, without critical judgment). Poetic inspiration is 
the province of the creative genius. We can recognize the genius because there is “no mechanism 
in him or his work, nothing that can be analyzed and rationalized” (Barzun, 475). The genius 
creates “without precedent either in concrete example or in codified precepts and rules” (Barzun, 
195). Originality is the hallmark of artistic creation for the Romantics and the genius is the 
originator par excellence. The Romantics believed that, in creating beauty, the artist also 
revealed truth; as a consequence they had great faith in the power of the creative genius to 
change the world. Poets, according to Shelley, are “the unacknowledged legislators of the world” 
(quoted in Barzun, 474). What we have, then, is a picture of a special sort of individual who, 
through an act of imagination, creates an original, artistic vision, a vision that is unanticipated, 
unprecedented and not the result of traditional rules or critical judgment, but a vision that can 
change the world. This is the Romantic creative genius  -- or Rorty’s strong poet. 
Although the Romantic view focused on the arts, the picture of innovation that it 
elaborated has been extended into other areas as well, including scientific discovery.  An 
influential version is that of Thomas Kuhn (1962) in his distinction between normal science and 
revolutionary science. Normal science, the mainstay of scientific activity, takes place in the 
context of a fixed paradigm which guides research, specifying the problems to be undertaken and 
the procedures, rules and criteria to be used in investigating these problems. Normal scientific 
activity is uncritical of the assumptions of the paradigm. Revolutionary science, on the other 
hand, is characterized by a radical departure from the prevailing paradigm and the creation of a 
completely new one. This new paradigm is not a logical continuation of the previous one, but 
involves a new way of viewing phenomena and is, thus, incommensurable with the old 
paradigm. Since criteria of evaluation are applicable only within paradigms, there can be no 
paradigm-neutral criteria according to which to choose between paradigms. Thus the acceptance 
of a new paradigm is not made on the basis of rational evaluation but can only be a type of 
conversion or gestalt switch. The parallels between Kuhn’s view of theory change in science and 
the view of innovation offered by Rorty are very strong. 
Another aspect of the Romantic view of innovation applied to science can be seen in the 
theories of Paul Feyerabend (1975). Feyerabend denies that there are any rules of method that are 
consistent and invariable with respect to all scientific practice. This is not a descriptive claim 
about poor scientific practice, however. Rather, he is making the claim that there could not be 
such rules, that the adherence to any invariable rules of method would be detrimental to scientific 
progress because they would keep one locked into the presuppositions of an existing theory. The 
only way in which the hold of a prevailing theory can be broken is by the positing of an entirely 
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new theory, unconnected with the old one. The only method he accepts for scientific discovery is 
‘anything goes.’ 
And even Karl Popper, although disagreeing with Feyerabend’s claims regarding the 
impossibility of rules of method for the evaluation of theories, holds strongly to a 
discovery/justification distinction and relegates discovery to the realm of the irrational. 
 
[M]y view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical 
method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be 
expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative 
intuition,’ in Bergson’s sense (1959, 32). 
 
Aspects of this Romantic view of creativity have also thoroughly permeated popular 
consciousness, but in a somewhat democratized form. There is common acceptance of the idea 
that innovations are radically new and that a mode of thinking different from everyday logic is 
required to generate new ideas. One popular example is Edward de Bono’s (1970) concept of 
lateral thinking. In contrast to vertical thinking, which is logical, evaluative and involves 
remaining rigidly within a framework, lateral thinking is strictly generative, producing new ideas 
without judging them, defying the logic of the framework, and making new connections between 
disparate elements. 
One difference between the Romantic view of innovation and this contemporary popular 
version is that this special mode of creative thinking is no longer thought to be the exclusive 
purview of the genius. Rather, it can be learned and so is, in principle, open to everyone. Hence 
the plethora of creativity self-help books and do-it-yourself creativity videos with evocative titles 
such as A Knock on the Side of the Head and A Kick in the Seat of the Pants, that offer 
suggestions for ‘breaking set’ and ‘thinking outside the box’ (my favourite is the video 
guaranteeing to make you more creative in 30 days or your money back). Such materials warn of 
the dangers of too much logic; suggest techniques such as visualization, stimulating thinking 
with random information, and brainstorming (i.e., generating without judging); and offer advice 
such as: break the rules, unlearn what you know, follow your dreams, and consult a fool (von 
Oech 1986, 1993; Adams 1986). 
 One conclusion that can be drawn from this quick march through theories of creativity is 
that Rorty’s view has a history and is linked to a tradition of thinking about issues regarding the 
nature and source of innovation and the role of logic and argument therein. It is not a new idea. 
The question still remains, is it sparkling? 
 
 
Critique 
 
I believe that there are serious problems with Rorty’s view of innovation and of argument 
and that these significantly detract from the lustre of his idea. 
 
i) Discontinuity 
 
First, the claim regarding the discontinuity between vocabularies/paradigms/frameworks is 
problematic both conceptually and empirically. On the conceptual front, the problem is that 
comprehension seems to presuppose continuity. If a new idea or practice emerged which were 
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totally unconnected with any human traditions and practices, we would not be able to understand 
it. It is connections to what is familiar that render innovations comprehensible and give us 
grounds for seeing them as innovations as opposed to merely being strange. Innovations arise in 
the context of an enterprise that has a history and is part of a tradition, and the tradition has a 
direction, goals and meaning in light of which originality can be recognized.1
 The discontinuity thesis also faces problems on the empirical front in that a close analysis 
of actual cases of innovation seems regularly to reveal continuities between new works and the 
previous traditions. The arts represent the model of creation for the Romantics, and to some 
extent for Rorty, yet even here connections to the problems, methods and techniques of the 
tradition seem always to be in evidence. A radical innovation such as Picasso’s cubism, for 
example, can be seen as an attempt to grapple with a specifically artistic problem – the 
simultaneous portrayal of multiple perspectives. Moreover the continuity with the work of earlier 
and contemporary artists such as Cézanne, Matisse, Derain and Delacroix, and the influences of 
Iberian sculpture and non-European art are very clear. 
  Such continuities are evident in science as well. Numerous historians and philosophers 
of science have pointed out the conceptual and methodological continuities between successive 
theories and have demonstrated that even scientific discoveries that may appear revolutionary 
have their roots in the problems and theories of previous paradigms. Hattiangadi (1980), for 
example, describes Newton’s development of the law of gravitation in terms of entirely logical 
physical and mathematical arguments. Brown (1977) illustrates how Einstein’s theoretical 
innovations arose from his arguments against existing theories and took as their point of 
departure some of the ideas of the rejected hypotheses. And Toulmin (1972) demonstrates that 
neither the changeover from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics nor the ‘Copernican revolution’ 
were characterized by the kind of complete rational discontinuity that Kuhn suggests. Rather, 
these changes were gradual and there is clear evidence that they were “argued every step of the 
way” (105). He points out, for example, that the testimony of the physicists who switched from a 
classical to a relativistic position shows no evidence of an intellectual conversion. Rather “they 
presented the arguments that sanctioned their change of theoretical standpoint” (104). Similarly, 
Kuhn’s own historical account makes clear that the ‘Copernican Revolution’ took a century and 
a half to complete and was the outcome of rational discussion (105). Toulmin summarizes thus: 
 
We must face the fact that paradigm-switches are never as complete as the fully-fledged 
definition implies; that rival paradigms never really amount to entire alternative world-
views, and that intellectual discontinuities on the theoretical level of science conceal 
underlying continuities at a deeper, methodological level (105-106). 
 
It may be that some changes in traditions appear so radical because we tend to view them from a 
distance. A closer analysis may be required to see the continuities. Indeed, this is the conclusion 
of Miller’s (1984) historical study documenting the gradual development of the new quantum 
theories in the early twentieth century: 
 
The notion of scientific revolutions describes only the gross structure of scientific 
change. In the fine structure, where change is gradual, resides the fascinating problem of 
the nature of creative scientific thinking (301). 
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 The realm of social and philosophical innovation seems to be of particular interest to 
Rorty, but here too continuities to past thought are everywhere in evidence. The types of 
innovations that might be thought to manifest progress have built upon, as opposed to completely 
overturning, previous social and philosophical ideas (Bailin 1992c). The insights of critical 
theory, for example, can be traced back through Marx to Hegelian dialectic, and many feminist 
theories are rooted in previous Marxist and liberal philosophies. The critical theorist Henri 
Giroux (1991, 2-3) acknowledges this continuity thus: 
 
Modernism provides theoretical elements for analyzing both the limits of its own 
historical tradition and for developing a political standpoint in which the breadth and 
specificity of democratic struggles can be expanded through the modernist ideals of 
freedom, justice, and equality. 
 
Sandra Harding (1990) makes a similar point with respect to feminist theory: 
 
However a specifically feminist alternative to Enlightenment projects may develop, it is 
not clear how it could completely take leave of Enlightenment assumptions and still 
remain feminist. The critics are right that feminism (also) stands on Enlightenment 
ground (99). 
 
The discontinuity thesis is a crucial supporting plank in Rorty’s view about the origins of 
innovation, but it cannot bear the weight of close scrutiny. 
 
ii Generation and Evaluation 
 
Let me turn, then, to the other main plank of his view, the opposition between the 
generation and the criticism of ideas. To recap, the principle idea is that the activity of criticism, 
which is the realm of argument, is confined within the bounds of particular frameworks 
(paradigms or vocabularies). It is not, however, possible between frameworks because all criteria 
of evaluation are framework-specific. For this reason, the generation of new ideas cannot be the 
product of an evaluative process. Rather, it is a creative process involving imagination, 
inspiration and a-rational leaps. Generation and criticism are distinct and mutually exclusive 
kinds of thinking. 
There are problems here as well. First, I think that this opposition is lent plausibility by the 
discontinuity thesis. If innovation really were discontinuous with past frameworks, then it might 
appear that the kind of thinking applicable within the framework could not lead to the 
transcending of the framework. Conceptual change might seem to require explanation in terms of 
a special kind of thinking. Once it is recognized, however, that there are continuities between 
frameworks and that some of the criteria of evaluation will remain intact, then a motivating 
reason for positing such a dichotomy disappears. 
 
 
Generation as Critical  
 
What of the claim that the generation of new ideas cannot be the product of an evaluative 
process, in other words that generation is uncritical? It is important to note that what is of interest 
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here is originality, not mere novelty. The generation of novelty is easy. Any random word or 
bizarre act may be new. What is at issue are new ideas that are effective or valuable, that meet a 
need or solve a problem, that are significant in the context of a domain -- new ideas that 
contribute to progress, new ideas that sparkle.  And it seems clear that the generation of such 
ideas must involve critical judgment and evaluation. Critical judgment is required in the initial 
identification of some phenomena as in need of exploration or explanation. Recognizing the 
inadequacies in current approaches and deciding that a new approach is required are also aspects 
of generation that involve critical evaluation. And determining potentially fruitful directions for 
exploration or investigation and recognizing possible solutions or satisfactory outcomes are 
products of judgment as well. The generation of effective new ideas must be constrained by 
critical criteria. If it were not, the results would be chaos not creation. Not all assumptions, 
criteria and methods can be overturned. Some elements of the previous framework must remain, 
elements in the light of which the new idea takes on meaning and significance.2
Thus I would argue that the criteria of critical appraisal do not have to be discarded in 
order to transcend some of the assumptions of the current framework. Rather, one is led to 
question current assumptions in the light of one’s reasoning about the problem or reflection on 
the situation. It would seem, then, that becoming entrenched in one way to view a problem is not 
a case of being trapped by the critical procedures of the tradition as Feyerabend, among others, 
would claim, but is, rather, a failure to be sufficiently critical. 
The idea that the generation of new ideas is uncritical also rests on a particular view of the 
nature of the frameworks within which critical thinking operates. Frameworks seem to be 
conceived of as rigidly bounded and highly rule-governed, with all the information for making 
judgments contained within the framework. Yet there are only a very limited number of cases in 
which we operate within such clear-cut, clearly defined, and rigidly bounded frameworks (formal 
logic or the game of chess might be examples). In most instances of problem-solving and 
creation, however, frameworks overlap, shift and have indefinite boundaries. Moreover relevant 
considerations may emanate from a variety of perspectives or frames of reference (Bailin 1992a). 
Given the above, there is no need to posit non-rational, imaginative leaps to explain the 
generation of new ideas. Going beyond the information given is, rather, a feature of all our 
intelligent thought and behaviour and does not require special explanation. A number of 
psychologists have pointed out the incremental nature of thinking that leads to innovation and 
have demonstrated how ordinary processes such as noticing, recognizing, searching, 
remembering, and evaluating can, together, contribute to creative results (Weisberg 1993; 
Perkins 1981). This is not to deny the reality of the feeling of insight we often experience when 
getting an idea or solving a problem. It is to deny only that such a feeling is an accurate 
indication that an a-rational leap has actually taken place. 
       In suggesting a role for critical judgment in innovation, it may appear that I am rejecting the 
well-known distinction in philosophy of science between discovery and justification and arguing 
for a logic of discovery. That is not entirely the case, however. The discovery/justification 
distinction is meant to suggest that considerations relating to discovery are irrelevant to the 
justificatory enterprise, and I am not disputing this. Whether the solution to a scientific problem 
were discovered in a laboratory or revealed by the Oracle of Delphi would have no bearing on its 
justification. What I am claiming is that criteria of justification play a role in discovery. I am 
disputing Popper’s claim that discovery is irrational. 
Given what we know about the world and about the practice of science, the Delphic 
Oracle theory of discovery is not a plausible one. Discoveries do not suddenly spring forth fully 
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formed absent of context. Rather, scientific discoveries arise in the context of ongoing scientific 
investigation. A scientist is always in media res, working on particular problems within a rich 
problem context that includes previous theories, experimental results, techniques of analysis, and 
standards for judging the worth of scientific contributions (Schaffner 1980, 198). These are the 
source of both ideas and constraints. In the course of this activity, problems evolve and are 
refined and new problems emerge. As Nickles so aptly put it (pace Samuel Butler):  “A theory is 
but a problem’s way of generating new problems” (Nickels 1980, 53). 
And the context is the source of constraints on the possibilities for solution. Nickels again:  
 
the constraints constitute a rich supply of premises and context-specific rules for reasoning 
toward a problem solution and permit us to explain the fact that scientists do reason to 
solutions (37). 
 
These arguments suggest a process of discovery not as a single moment of inspiration, but 
rather as a gradual, ongoing process in which insight and justification are interwoven. 
Hattiangadi (1980) argues, in fact, that it is impossible to clearly distinguish pure contexts of 
discovery since any idea that might be considered in the context of discovery with respect to one 
theory will itself be a part of the context of justification of a previous theory out of which it 
developed. Finocchiaro (1980) makes the same point with respect to Galileo’s Dialogue 
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems: 
 
suppose that the whole Dialogue is categorized as an attempt to prove Copernicanism, and 
hence placed in the context of justification; in the course of such an attempted proof one 
may find himself formulating the principle of mechanical relativity, or of conservation of 
motion. Then the same book constitutes context of discovery from the point of view of 
those principles (94-95).  
 
I am not here arguing for a logic of discovery in the sense of an algorithm for making 
discoveries. I am, rather arguing for the rationality of discovery. I would agree with Nickels 
(1980, 40) that “discovery normally is a reasoned, judgmental process (too rich to be 
informatively captured by a content-neutral logic).” 
 
 
Criticism as Generative 
 
We have seen the problems with the idea that the generation of novel ideas is non-critical. 
I believe that there are also problems with the complementary idea, namely that criticism lacks a 
generative component. This idea is based on the assumption that the activity of criticism is 
strictly analytic, selective and rule-determined. Given the necessary information from within the 
relevant framework and the appropriate reasoning techniques, the process of arriving at a 
judgment is largely algorithmic. 
A closer examination of the process of criticism would suggest, however, that critical 
evaluation is not algorithmic but has a generative, imaginative component.3 The application of 
evaluative criteria is seldom automatic but involves the interpretation of the situation and 
imaginative judgment regarding their applicability and satisfaction. Overall assessment in any 
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complex circumstance requires the consideration of alternatives and ultimately the construction 
of a position based on the weighing, reconciling and integrating of a variety of points of view. 
        Let us take, as an example, the species of argument criticism that is the domain of Informal 
Logic. Due to its ancestry in formal deductive logic, the domain of informal logic may appear a 
closed system involving algorithmic procedures for the correct assessment of arguments. This 
seems, in fact, to be the picture of argument that underlies Rorty’s view. Such a model becomes 
inappropriate, however, when dealing with real arguments in natural language. In the latter case, 
argument criticism, although constrained by rules, is not determined by rules but is a constructive 
enterprise (Bailin 1990). 
 Criticism involves, first, the interpretation of arguments, but this is not a straightforward 
and simple process. We construct an interpretation guided by textual information but texts are 
always and necessarily incomplete, and at times several plausible inferences can be made 
depending on background knowledge and assumptions. This incompleteness also means that the 
receiver has a role to play in constructing meaning, leaving open the possibility of differing 
equally justified interpretations. 
 Supplying the missing premises and unstated assumptions of an argument also involves 
imaginative construction on the part of the evaluator. The fact that considerable debate exits over 
how to fill in missing premises suggests that it may not be possible to formalize a method for 
doing so. The constructive dimension becomes even more salient in the case of finding unstated 
assumptions. As Scriven (1976) has demonstrated, finding the illuminating assumptions of an 
argument as opposed to the obvious unhelpful ones requires “a substantial slice of original 
thinking” (169). Context and background knowledge as well as informal logical principles are 
required in order to reconstruct an argument. 
 The process of argument evaluation also displays a creative dimension. Most natural 
language arguments are not strictly deductive but rather contain types of reasoning which leave 
some play between the premises and conclusions. As Blair and Johnson (1987) point out, 
arguments may contain reasoning in which: 
 
the conclusion follows, ceteris paribus, or on balance, or in some other qualified way 
which suggests a more tenuous relationship between premises and conclusions than 
would be the case with either deductive or inductive reasoning (43). 
 
As a consequence, the procedure for the assessing of arguments cannot be formalized. There is 
room for differences of view with respect to the evaluation of particular arguments. 
 This indeterminacy can be seen in that aspect of argument evaluation dealing with the 
identification of fallacies and is apparent with respect to all three types of fallacies: fallacies of 
relevance, of sufficiency and of acceptability. There may, for example, be legitimate debate as to 
the relevance of certain considerations to an argument and a judgment regarding relevance may 
depend on what unstated assumptions are supposed. According to Johnson and Blair (1983, 39), 
“relevance is always a judgment call, and there is no reason to think that any algorithmic 
procedure will come along to change that.” The situation is similar with respect to fallacies of 
sufficiency. Although there are principles that guide the assessment of sufficiency, there is no 
algorithm for determining how much evidence is sufficient. And again with respect to 
acceptability, Johnson and Blair (1983) tell us that judgments of acceptability are dialectical and 
must be determined with an imagined audience in mind and in light of purposes. 
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  Evaluating arguments by analogy also requires a contribution on the part of the assessor. 
Determining the appropriateness of an analogy involves imagining the similarities and 
differences between the cases and may require considerable imaginative reconstruction and the 
supplying of context. 
 Inventing a counter-example to test the strength of an argument is clearly a creative act, 
as is the consideration of alternative arguments. As Scriven (1976, 36) so eloquently states: 
 
The process of trying to think of alternative explanations of a set of facts … is an entirely 
creative process. It is exactly the process which the great original scientist goes through 
in coming up with a novel theory. There are no precise rules to guide one in such a 
search, and it requires imagination nurtured by a rich and varied experience to generate 
the novel hypothesis here. So the very process of criticism necessarily involves the 
creative activity of generating new theories or hypotheses to explain phenomena that 
have seemed to other people to admit of only one explanation. 
 
 An aspect of argumentation which falls within the domain of Informal Logic but which 
seems to be ignored by Rorty’s exclusion of argument from innovation is the construction of 
arguments. The activity of argumentation does not consist solely in interpreting and evaluating 
already existing arguments. It also consists in coming up with arguments. And coming up with 
new arguments is a creative activity, consisting in the recognition of problems or alternatives and 
the construction of a coherent chain of reasoning. Such construction must, however, conform to 
all the critical standards that guide evaluation. Moreover, the constructor must recognize any 
logical vulnerabilities in the argument. The constructor is, then, simultaneously a critic. The 
critic makes an imaginative contribution to the assessment in all the ways previously described 
and must be able to construct a cogent argument to support the critique. The critic is, then, 
simultaneously a constructor. Argument construction and critique are, thus, inseparable and 
intertwined aspects of the same process, the process of argumentation. 
 In considering the role of argument in conceptual change, it is important to focus on the 
whole process of argumentation and not just on the assessment of isolated arguments. 
Argumentation is a dialectical process that involves the construction as well as the evaluation of 
particular arguments but also, ultimately, of entire beliefs sets or views. In the process of 
argumentation, claims are proposed along with their justification, the claims and reasons are 
tested and challenged, they may be rejected or reformulated, alternative arguments may be 
proposed, these will be tested and perhaps reformulated, and in the end a view is arrived at which 
takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of the various arguments and synthesizes the 
strongest elements into a coherent whole. The view thus arrived at will be provisional as any 
particular instance of argumentation is but one piece of a larger process of belief formation and 
testing (Blair and Johnson), one moment in an ongoing disciplinary and social conversation 
(Bailin 1992b). 
 
 
Inquiry  
 
What I am offering, then, is an alternative picture of how inquiry proceeds to the one 
suggested by Rorty. For Rorty, inquiry seems to be constituted by two distinct and separate kinds 
of activities. On the one hand there is the analytic, logical, bounded and conservative activity of 
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argumentation or criticism, which works with existing concepts and allows for the manipulation 
of elements within frameworks that are static, singular and self-contained. On the other hand we 
have the speculative, creative, progressive activity of strong poetry, which transcends 
frameworks and creates new ideas, new visions, and new vocabularies unconstrained by the 
strictures of critical judgment and argumentation. 
 What I propose is a picture of inquiry as a single activity constituted by the dynamic 
interplay between generation and criticism. Engaging in our various traditions and practices of 
inquiry always and simultaneously involves both. In attempting to solve problems posed by the 
tradition, both the constraints of logic and the inventiveness of imagination come into play. And 
in some cases, our reasoning will lead us to question assumptions, break rules and put elements 
together in new ways – thus issuing in ideas that may display considerable novelty. 
  This process of inquiry is instantiated in disciplines and traditions of inquiry that are 
open-ended, dynamic, plural, and overlapping. There are live questions, ongoing debates and 
areas of controversy within every discipline that furnish the arena for evolution and change 
(Bailin 1992a). Moreover a central characteristic of rational inquiry is that “it aims to discover its 
own weaknesses and rectify what is at fault with its own procedures” (Lipman 1991, 121). Thus 
the critical procedures of the traditions provide for the possibility of the evolution of the tradition 
itself in light of new evidence and arguments, problems and limitations discovered in the course 
of inquiry, and criticisms from competing strands both within the traditions and outside it. There 
is no need to posit strong poetry to account for conceptual change. Argumentation, as 
instantiated in our traditions of inquiry, can achieve that goal. 
   I want to make clear that in making this argument, I am in no way denigrating the 
importance of poetry. I have great respect for, indeed passion for poetry and think that the arts 
have a crucially important role to play in envisioning possible futures. They can, as Greene 
(1995, 112) tells us, move us into spaces where “we can create visions of other ways of being 
and ponder what it might signify to realize them”. They can show us “in rich detail, as formal 
abstract argument cannot, what it is like to live a certain way" (Nussbaum 1990, 227-228). Thus 
they may conjure up evocative instantiations of those utopian visions, or equally powerful 
evocations of dystopian ones. 
There are several points to be made here, however. Poetic creations, like innovative works 
in other domains, are not discontinuous with the traditions out of which they develop. They have 
their roots in previous artistic traditions, methods, and problems; reveal influences from other 
artists; and employ critical analysis of aspects of society and culture. Insofar as such poetic 
visions are effective, insofar as they touch us and capture our imagination, considerable critical 
judgment (as well as imagination) would have gone into their creation. Second, this poetic 
activity does not obviate the necessity for critical evaluation of the ideas or visions thus created. I 
see poetry, then, as a complement to and not a substitute for argument. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is time now to return to the question that prompted this investigation initially: is 
argument for conservatives? What I think this journey through views about the nature of 
innovation and the role of argument points to is that Rorty’s idea is not a new one, and neither is 
it sparkling. Rather than forgetting where we once were as Rorty suggests, I think that it is 
crucially important to remember past traditions in order to participate in the critical dialogues 
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that they embody and to further the conversation. ‘Old routes of inference and feeling’ can lead 
to new ones. Argument is not so flat after all. So perhaps we ought to throw open the doors of 
our studies, discard our visors and sleeve protectors, don our boots and take our rightful place in 
those conceptual fields, making our contribution to the growth of ideas.  
 
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
1 This discussion of discontinuity is taken from Bailin (1992a).  
 
2 This discussion of generation as critical draws heavily on Bailin (1992a). 
 
3 For an elaboration of this argument regarding the generative dimension of criticism, see Bailin 
(1990). 
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